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Abstract _ 
The main concern of this paper is to show the importance of 
demand uncertainty in the determination of the "natural rate of 
unemployment". In the goods market there is demand heterogeneity 
-coming from preferences, and demand uncertainty -related solely 
to heterogeneity. Demand uncertainty is introduced in a monopoly 
union model where unions set wages at the first stage of the 
game, without knowing with certainty the demand for the good 
produced by the firm. Because the union assigns a positive 
probability at the event "underemployment equilibrium", it 
expects that the expected unemployment rate be positive. Since 
all the uncertainty is firm specific (i.e., there is not 
aggregate uncertainty), aggregate employment is equal to the 
union expected employment and then there is unemployment at 
equilibrium. In some islands the idiosyncratic demand shock is 
high and firms produce constrained by its full-employment 
capacity, but at the same time in the other islands the 
idiosyncratic demand shock is low and firms optimally produce 
less than its full-employment output. 
Key words 
Unemployment; Monopoly Union; Demand Uncertainty. 
·universidad Carlos III de Madrid. I thank Rodolphe Dos santos, 
Joaquim Silvestre and the participants of both the 1993 Warwick 
Summer Research Workshop and the SPES Project CT91-0079 for 
helpful comments. Financial support from the SPES Program and the 
DGICYT are gratefully acknowledged 
Working Paper 93-29 Departamento de Econom1a 
Economy series 08 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
October 1993 Calle Madrid, 126 
28903 Getafe (Madrid) 
Fax (34 1) 624-9875 
1 Introduction 
In unionized economies, nominal wages are normally set for a relatively long 
time of period, say one year, while employment fluctuates during the year 
depending on firms' particular situation. The standard "right to manage" 
model, as in McDonald and Solow (1981), even if it assumes that wages 
are set before the firm decides employment, does not reflect completely this 
important sequence in the decision process, assuming that both decisions 
are taken under the same information concerning the environment. In this 
paper, new information is reveled in between both decisions, allowing the 
firm to decide employment with a richer information that the union has 
when deciding wages l . This sequence in the wage bargaining process leans 
on the assumption of nominal wages rigidities. 
Many different types of uncertainty are relevant to the analysis of wage 
bargaining. Information concerning the aggregate price index, as in Lu-
cas (1972) must generate some type of Lucas' supply curve. Technological 
uncertainty or aggregate demand uncertainty could also be important to ex-
plain the behavior of employment and wages over the business cycle, as it 
is reported by Hansen and Wright (1992). However, we concentrate our at-
tention on the effects of demand uncertainty coming from miss-information 
about individual preferences. As it is frequently reported in the literature on 
Marketing, firms are mainly concerned with forecasting their market shares2 • 
However, macroeconomists seem to be more interested in the effects of tech-
nological shock and aggregate demand shocks than in the effects that id-
iosyncratic demand shocks have on the aggregate equilibrium. 
The main structure of the model is taken from Licandro (1992) and 
Arnsperger and de la Croix (1993t The economy is, in some way, orga-
nized as the Lucas island economy. In each island, there is only one firm 
1 Manning (1987) and Espinosa and Rhee (1989) develop more general frameworks to 
analyze the question: are wage bargaining contracts efficient or do the union let the firm 
to manage employment? In both papers it is assumed that, even if both decision are 
taken sequentially at two different stages of the game, the information concerning the 
environment is the same in both stages. The existence of asymmetric information, or 
costly information research, or costly bargaining process, could be useful to attempt an 
explanation for this particular sequence of the wage bargaining process. 
2See Lambin (1993). 
3It is an attempt of reconciling the "fix-price" or "quantity rationing approach" with 
the "New-Keynesian economics," in particular with the monopolistic competitive general 
equilibrium approach. We show in this paper that the main results in Licandro (1992) and 
Arnsperger and de la Croix (1993) do not depend on the existence of "quantity rationing" 
in the goods market. The essential element of the model is related with the sequence of 
decisions and the structure of information. 
2 
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-which produces a differentiate~ good, a given number of households and a 
union, which represents households. The information structure of the model 
is crucial. It is a one period model, where decisions are made at two different 
moments in time. Ex-ante, when preferences are not yet revealed, households 
decide to live and to work in a particular island and unions set the nominal 
wage. Unions are organized at the firm level, given place to some type of 
descentralized negotiation. Ex-post, when all relevant information is public, 
monopolistically competitive firms decide prices, employment and produc-
tion and households decide consumption. The goods market is organized 
as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Individual preferences are not symmetric, 
allowing for demand heterogeneity, Le., some firms will have a high demand 
and some other firms a small demand. All the uncertainty is idiosyncratic 
(Le, there is no aggregate uncertainty) and it is directly related to demand 
heterogeneity. 
To stress the importance of information problems, we analyze a simple 
monopoly union model 1 in which there is full-employment at the equilibrium 
with perfect information. However, when there are information problems, 
which take the form of demand uncertainty, the nominal wage set by the 
union does not grant full-employment at equilibrium. The existence of un-
employment does not rely on the existence of union power, as in the standard 
"right to manage" model. In this sense, this paper provides an explanation 
for the "natural rate of unemployment," which is related to the existence of 
firm specific demand uncertainty and nominal wage rigidities. 
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 describes the gen-
eral characteristics of the economy. In Section 3 the representative household 
problem is solved and the demand for goods is computed. In Section 4 we 
solve for the firm problem and the monopoly union problem. Section 5 gives 
the aggregate equilibrium. Conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
The Econoluy 
There are three types of economic agents: households, unions and firms. 
Each household supplies a given quantity of labor to a particular firm and 
demands goods. Households are represented by unions, which are organized 
at the firm level and set wages. Firms hire labor from households, produce 
differentiated goods and set prices. 
A particular information structure is assumed: there are two times in the 
model, ex-ante (before the revelation of individual preferences over goods) 
and ex-post (when all relevant information is public). Households supply 
3 
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labor and unions decide wages without knowing with certainty the demand 
for the good produced by the firm. When wages are already set, households 
reveal their preferences and demand goods and firms set prices, hire workers 
and produce. 
As in McDonnald and Solow, there are two stages in the game. In the 
first stage the union sets the nominal wage and in the second stage the firm 
sets prices and hires workers in order to satisfy its demand. The main differ-
ence with the standard monopoly union model is that the firm information 
concerning the environment, when deciding employment, is richer than the 
union information when deciding wages. When the union sets the nominal 
wage the demand for the firm is not revealed yet, while the firm knows its 
own demand before deciding how many workers to hire. In this sense, the 
model imposes some type of wage rigidity. 
The Demand Side 
Households behave as in Dixit and Stiglitz. Let us assume that all of them 
have the same utility function, hold the same initial money balances and 
supply the same given quantity of labor. 
The Representative Household 
There is a continuum of households in the interval [0, n], each of them offering 
one unit of labor. There is also a continuum of goods in the interval [0,1]. 
Households are indexed by j and goods by i. Households are identical except 
for the fact that their labor incomes are not necessarily the same. The 
representative consumer optimization problem is 
M)I-"YC"Ymax 
{c(i)},¥ 
-( P 
where 
C = (11 v(i)~c(i)¥di) ~ 
o> 1 and 11 v(i)di = 1; 
subject to 11 p( i)c(i)di = I; 
4 
1, p and p( i) Vi E [0,1] are given. 0 is an index of consumption utility, M 
represents money holdings and p the aggregate price index. c( i) and p( i) are 
the consumption and the price of the good i, respectively. The parameters 
I' () and v(i), Vi E [0,1], are supposed given. 1 represents total nominal 
revenues of the representative consumer and it can be different from one 
household to another. 
Optimal consumption and money holdings are4 
1 
0=1-
P 
and 
M = (1 -1)1. 
Notice that the "indirect utility function," which can be derived by sub-
stituting both optimality conditions in the utility function, is proportional 
to real revenues. 
The optimality condition for c( i) is 
c(i) = (p;)rC vii), (1) 
where 
P = (11 I v(i)p(i)I-9di ) ~ 
is the "true price index" associated with the representative household utility 
function 5 • 
Let us call I(j) at the total revenues of the household j: 
1(j) = !if + w(j)l(j) + fl ~ 1r(i)di, 
n lo n 
where A1 represents aggregate initial money holdings, w(j) is the nominal 
wage rate and l(j) E {O, I} represents employment. Profits, denoted by 1r(i), 
are distributed among households. The share of the firm i is supposed to 
be the same for all households and equal to ~. The only difference among 
households comes from the equilibrium value of labor incomes w(j)l(j). 
4Since the utility function is concave in its arguments and the budget constraint is 
linear, the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for a maximum. 
5The normalization condition imposed over the v parameters in problem (1), implies 
that p = p if p(i) = p'Vi E [0,1]. 
5 
4 
Let us define profits as 
1r(i) = p(i)y(i) - w(i)l(i). 
Aggregating revenues over consumers, we have that 
l n I(j)dj = At +pij. 
Variable ij represents aggregate production, and it takes the same functional 
form that the quantity index C. 
Imposing the condition fon C(j)dj = ij on the goods market, which must 
verify at equilibrium, from previous conditions we get 
Let c( i, j) represent the demand of good i from household j. Integrating 
equation (1) over households we have that total demand d( i) for good i is 
d(i) = (p~)r yv(i). (2) 
Aggregate demand, ij, is distributed among the differentiated goods depend-
ing on relative prices and the v (i) para.meters6 • 
Demand heterogeneity is directly related to the distribution of the v pa-
rameter among firms. It plays a very import role in the model, because all 
uncertainty comes from the absence of perfect information concerning this 
parameter. 
The Supply Side 
In the supply side of this economy there is a continuum of monopolistically 
competitive firms, each of them producing a variety of the unique good. 
The index i also identifies firms. Each worker supplies one unit of labor 
6The firm i market share is 
p(i)d(i) = (P(i))l-e v(i), 
py P 
which depends on both the relative price and the v(i) parameter. At the symmetric 
equilibrium the market share is equal to v(i). 
6 
to an specific firm 7 • Workers are uniformly distributed among firms and, 
from previous assumptions, the number of workers offering their labor to a 
particular firm is n. There is a continuum of unions, each of them represents 
the workers offering their labor to a particular firm. Unions are also indexed 
by i. At the firm level, unions set wages as a monopoly. 
An important assumption is imposed to produce full-employment capac-
ities at the firm level: labor markets are segmented. Each worker is offering 
his labor to an specific firm and, if a firm decides not to hire a worker, this 
worker is unable to offer his labor to another firm. Labor market segmen-
tation can be justified by differences in human capital, labor mobility costs, 
turnover costs, etc. Under this assumption each firm faces an upper-bound 
on production, i.e., the "full-employment output". This assumption is crucial 
to have unemployment at equilibrium. 
4.1 FirIn Behayior 
Let us assume that the labor marginal productivity is constant and equal to 
one, i.e., there is a constant returns to scale technology 
y(1:) = l(i) 
where y( i) and l( i) represent firm's i production and employment. Notice 
that firm's employment, l(i) E [0, n], is different to household's employment 
l(j) E {O, I}. Full-employment output is equal to n for all i. 
Under the previous conditions, the representative firm must solve the 
following optimization problem: 
max 7l"(i) = (p(i) - w(i))y(i) (3)
p(l),y(,) 
subject to 
( ')) -8 ( ') P z _ ( ') yz= ( p yvz, 
y(i) ~ n, 
where y, p, nand w(i) are given. Parameters () and v(i) come from household 
preferences. 
The first order condition for this problem is: 
7Because the marginal desutility of labor is zero, the representative household is opti-
mally willing to work the maximum feasible time, which is assumed to be one, 
7 
if d( i) ::; n, 
( 1)-1p(i) = 1 - (j w(i); (4) 
if not, 
_ 1 
p(i) = p (~) i v(i)~. (5) 
Depending on the relation between demand d( i) and full-employment ca-
pacity n, the representative firm sets prices following two different rules. 
When demand is relatively small, the firm sets a price that verifies the stan-
dard condition for a monopoly, i.e., marginal costs equal to marginal revenues 
(interior solution). When the optimal condition for a monopolistic compet-
itive firm verifies for a demand greater than full-employment capacities, the 
firm sets a higher price in order to satisfy demand at the full-employment 
level (corner solution). 
Let us call 
(6) 
at the value of v(i) at which the interior solution verifies at the corner, i.e., 
both conditions (4) and (5) verifies simultaneously. 
From the restrictions in problem (3), and the corresponding optimal con-
dition (equations (4) and (5)), we can deduce the optimal employment of 
firm i: 
if v(i) ::; v(i), 
. . v( i) n 
l(z)=ld(z)= v(i) ::;n, (7) 
if not, 
l(i) = n. (8) 
In the interior solution, the firm is choosing employment over its uncon-
strained labol' demand curve, denoted ld(i) in equation (7). In this case, the 
firm does not employ all the workers living in the island and there will be 
unemployment in this segment of the market. In the corner solution, the 
firm is constrained by the labor supply and producing at its full-employment 
output. 
4.2 Monopoly Union Behavior 
In each island, a trade union represents the workers offering their labor to the 
firm producing the corresponding variety. The union is assumed to behave 
8 
as a monopoly in the labor market. 
The objective function of the ith union is: 
V(w(i),l(i)) = (W~i)) l(i), 
where V is the sum of the indirect utility functions of the risk-neutral mem-
bers after the deduction of the fall-back level, 
1AI 1r(i)d'
-+1-- z, pop 
i.e., the non-human revenues. 
The Standard Monopoly Union Model 
To give a better understanding of the results provided in this paper, let us 
solve first the standard monopoly union model, in which wages and employ-
ment are decided under the same information set. Let us assume in this 
section (this assumption will be dropped in the next) that the union has full-
information, in particular that it knows the value of v(i) faced by the firm 
i. It can be easily shown that, under this assumption the monopoly union 
is optimally setting nominal wages in order to have full-employment at equi-
librium. The main reason for that is that the inverse of the labor demand 
elastici ty 0) is smaller than the elasticity of the indifference curves (which 
is equal to one), anywhere. In which case the union is interested in reducing 
wages until full-employment is reached. As Figure 1 shows, the optimal elec-
tion for the union is to set a nominal wage that induces the firm to optimally 
choose to produce at full-employment. In other words, the union is choosing 
w(i) in such a way that both equations (4) and (5) verify simultaneously. 
Under these particular assumptions, if wages and employment are decided 
under the same information set, there is full-employment at equilibrium in 
the standard monopoly union model. 
Monopoly Union Behavior under Demand Uncertainty 
Let us assume that, when deciding wages, the ith union knows the "demand 
function" assigned to the variety i, equation (2) and the distribution of the 
v( i) parameters, denoted by F(v). However, we assume that the represen-
tative union does not know with certainty the specific v( i) faced by the ith 
9 
firm. Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, the union can solve for the 
aggregate demand ii and the aggregate price index p. 
Notice that under this conditions all unions are ex-ante identical, even if 
ex-post the labor demand tan be different from one island to another. Then, 
they set the same wage rate and they face the same v. For this reason, we 
can drop the i index for the next. 
Since the objective of the union is linear in 1, under demand uncertainty, 
the union is mainly concerned with the forecast of expected employment. 
From equations (7) and (8), expected employment can be written as8 
E(l) = ~ l~fJ vdF(v) +n l?fJ dF(v) ~ n, (9) 
where v is given by equation (6). 
As stated before, the distribution function F(v) represents the distri-
bution of parameter v among the different firms and it depends on house-
hold's preferences. The union knows that its specific v is drawn from this 
distribution. If there is a strictly positive probability of being in a unem-
ployment equilibrium, expected employment will be strictly smaller than 
full-employment. 
Let us define the weighted probability of being in a full-employment equi-
librium as 
PUJ(l = n) = l?v E~l) dF(v), 
and the weighted probability of being in an unemployment equilibrium as 
Pw(l ~ n) = %l~ij E~l) dF(v). 
The representative union problem is 
m~x E(V) = (;) E(l), 
where E(l) is given by equation (9) and v is given by equation (6). Be-
cause there is not aggregate uncertainty, the aggregate variables p and ii are 
perfectly forecast by the union. 
The first order condition for this problem is 
E(l) v =oj v dF(v). (10) 
n tJ~fJ 
SThe expected value of the minimum condition has been largely analyzed in econometric 
disequilibrium models, in particular in the context of "aggregation over micro-markets in 
disequilibrium," as it is reported by Quandt (1988). 
10 
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Condition (10) can be interpreted in the following way: the union is optimally 
choosing the weighted probability of being in an unemployment equilibrium, 
whose optimal value is equal to the the inverse of the demand elasticity of 
labor (~). Notice that the weighted probability of being in a full-employment 
equilibrium is equal to (1 - ~). 
Figure 2 gives a graphic representation of this problem. The union maxi-
mize its utility function over the expected employment curve. Because there 
is a positive probability of ex-post unemployment, the union expected em-
ployment curve is always below full-employment, in particular at the opti-
mum. The expected employment locus is concave for any standard continu-
ous distribution function, which is a sufficient condition for the existence of 
an interior solution. 
Aggregate EUlploYluent 
Aggregate employment can be obtained by aggregation over firm's employ-
ment and it must be equal to union's expected employment given by equa-
tion (9)9. Moreover, the optimality condition (10) must hold at equilib-
rium. Aggregate employment I, aggregate production y, aggregate real wages 
(which are equal over all islands) and v must satisfy at equilibrium the fol-
lowing conditions: 
(;;1) = ~ l~tIVdF(v) + l?fJ dF(v) ~ 1, 
(i) v = oj vdF(v), n v~fJ 
V = ( 1 - ~ r' (;)' (~) , 
and 
_ ] 6(Y) [1-6 j j I ~ ;; = v"'T v~fJ vdF(v) + v?v vedF(v) , 
To better understand this result let us present an example, in which we 
assume a particular form for the distribution fu nction F(v). 
9The proposed definition of aggregate employment is the standard addition of employed 
workers, which does not take into account that the marginal value of workers is not nec-
essarily the same in all islands. For this reason the employment index and the production 
index are different, even if production is equal to employment for each firm. We keep the 
standard definition to be consistent with the literature on employment and unemployment. 
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EXAMPLE 
Let us assume that v follows a lognormal distribution, with unit mean and 
variance denoted by (j. In this case we can apply Lambert(1988) and ap-
proximate expected employment by the following function 
where p is a decreasing function of (j. In particular, *< 0, P --+ 00 when 
(j --+ 0 and we assume that p is positive, i.e., the variance (j is not too large. 
The representative union problem becomes 
m~x E(V) = (;) E(l) 
where 
and p, y and n are given. 
Solving this problem as in the previous section and solving for the equi-
librium value of aggregate employment T, we have 
(11 ) 
Since workers are distributed homogeneously among firms and the mar-
ginal productivity is the same for all of them (it was normalized to one), 
full-employment output n is equal across firms. Moreover, since unions are 
ex-ante identical, they set all the same real wage. Under these conditions the 
marginal cost function is the same for all firms and it is constant and finite 
until full-employment is reached, then it becomes infinitely elastic. Depend-
ing on their particular value for v, firms are setting prices and production 
either at the interior or at the corner solution. When demand is relativly 
small (v < v) in an island, production is smaller that full-employment out-
put. When demand is relativly large (v ~ v), the firm produces at full-
employment. At the aggregate there is unemployment. 
The unemployment rate takes the following equilibrium value, denoted 
by u, 
12 
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The unemployment rate at equilibrium depends on the elasticity of substitu-
tion () and on the parameter p, which depends on the variance of the distri-
bution of the v parameter. If () -+ 00 all goods become perfect substitutes, 
and if p -+ 00 the parameter v becomes the same for all goods. In both cases 
the heterogeneity of demand disapears and the unemployment rate goes to 
zero. The first derivative of u with respect to both parameters is negative, 
i.e., an increase in demand heterogeneity, coming from a greater elasticity of 
substitution or a great dispersion on the v parameters, always generates an 
increase in the unemployment rate. 
Conclusions 
The main concern of this paper is to show the importance of demand uncer-
tainty in the determination of the "natural rate of unemployment." Demand 
uncertainty is introduced in a monopoly union model where unions set wages 
at the first stage of the game, without knowing with certainty the demand for 
the good produced by the firm. Because the union assigns a positive probabil-
ity at the event "underemployment equilibrium," it sets an optimal nominal 
wage at which the expected employment is smaller than full-employment. In 
an economy where all the uncertainty is firm specific (i.e., there is not ag-
gregate uncertainty), aggregate employment is equal to the union expected 
employment and then there is unemployment at equilibrium. In some islands 
the idiosyncratic demand shock is high and firms produce constrained by its 
full-employment capacity, but at the same time in the other islands the id-
iosyncratic demand shock is low and firms optimally produce less than its 
full-employment output. 
The existence of unemployment depends crucially on the assumption of 
demand heterogeneity and demand uncertainty. The assumptions of nominal 
wage rigidity and labor market segmentation are not sufficient to generate 
this result. Moreover, the assumption of only one firm per island (monopolis-
tic competition) is not critical for the existence of unemployment at equilib-
rium, and the result holds even if there is perfect competition on the goods 
market of each island. In this sense, the "natural rate of unemployment," 
displayed by the model at equilibrium, relies mainly on the existence of "in-
formation problems" than on the existence of "coordination failures". 
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